



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Do Better Job Creation 
Subsidies Hold Real 


















Chapter 7 (pp. 161-182) in: 
Reining in the Competition of Capital 
Ann Markusen, ed. 




Copyright ©2007. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
161
7
Do Better Job Creation 
Subsidies Hold Real Promise for 
Business Incentive Reformers?
William Schweke
Corporation for Enterprise Development
INTRODUCTION: AN IMAGINARY DIALOGUE ON 
BUSINESS INCENTIVES
Typically, business incentive reformers win the intellectual argu-
ments about the downsides of business incentives, but state and local 
policymakers refuse to stop providing incentives. The following imag-
ined dialogue between a “wonk” reformer and a business recruiting 
“buffalo hunter” captures the “back-and-forth” of such a conversation. 
But there is one big difference: this conversation may offer a way out 
of the present impasse. 
Wonk: Business incentives are a waste of money, nationally speak-
ing. They only make sense if they are designed to correct a market failure 
or really move private investment into poorer communities. The typical 
recipient of public largess does not need the money to do the deal. They 
are instead shaking down the jurisdiction for what they can get. Contin-
ued incentive use also perpetuates an unceasing incentives “arms race” 
between jurisdictions and a virtual “war between the states.”
Buffalo Hunter: That is easy for you to say. It might be high-minded 
of you to take such a perspective, but I have to think “state” and “local.” 
These are my constituencies and my customers. Sometimes an incen-
tive can land a deal for my state and create some much-needed jobs. 
Wonk: That’s noble, but this is a game that you cannot win ultimate-
ly. If you also roll back your regulations and tax base to court footloose 
fi rms, it can lead to a “race to the bottom.” Eventually, you will inevita-
bly fall behind in the incentives competition: you match your peers, and 
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then come up with a new fi scal gimmick only to see it copied by oth-
ers. It just pushes the price tag up and up. Plus, there is also the danger 
of the “winner’s curse”: you land the deal, but end up paying way too 
much for it. Essentially, the company holds all the cards because only it 
knows what will tip the deal one way or the other.
Buffalo Hunter: Fine, but I can’t just sit on my hands. If I’m head-
ing down the wrong path, get the Feds to stop me. Regulate subnation-
al subsidy use, like the European Community does. Or get the World 
Trade Organization to pay more attention to America’s implicit indus-
trial policies and crack down on the most egregious of these.
Wonk: That’s not really the point. Just looking at the deals them-
selves, you should be a smart investor, not a chump. When negotiating 
you need to be sure to add stronger performance standards, increase 
transparency, conduct independent cost-benefi t analyses, and so forth. 
It will help you to be more cost-effective with your incentives and weed 
out the bad programs. 
Buffalo Hunter: Maybe, but my constituents can’t eat “good gov-
ernment.” Telling them I avoided some bad deals only goes so far. They 
want jobs.
Wonk: Of course they do, but the most important way to create jobs 
and wealth is to invest wisely in early childhood and K-12 education, 
research and development, higher education, infrastructure, and work-
force retraining. Modernize the tax structure and provide professional 
and predictable regulation.
Buffalo Hunter: I completely agree, but it takes so long to generate 
the jobs and enterprises that are yielded by these public investments. 
Plus, it is kind of invisible, compared to cutting ribbons at the construc-
tion site of a new 100-job project.
Wonk: Well, what if I were to tell you that I have a viable alternative 
to the limited promise of that ribbon cutting ceremony? What if I can 
give you an option that generates real returns in one year or less? It is 
guaranteed to foster development in all counties of a state—not just the 
most affl uent places, such as the metro areas (though it can help them, 
too). It is a game that everybody can play and win. It can really aid 
small businesses and help those workers and communities that are los-
ing jobs today. The option that I propose is a smarter approach: growth 
tax credits and direct grant incentives for targeted job creation.
Buffalo Hunter: I’m listening. Please continue.
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Such, in microcosm, is our current policy and political situation re-
garding business incentive reform. We are making headway. More cit-
ies and states are adopting performance standards, disclosure, and other 
accountability mechanisms. But, at the same time, the costs of incen-
tives and the expectations of business for public dollars are constantly 
escalating. 
We also win most of the policy arguments. Most technical policy 
experts believe that state and local business incentive competition is 
a zero sum (and at times a negative sum) game. Incentives are a waste 
of money, nationally speaking. They typically subsidize companies 
for jobs that they were already going to create. Incentives are unfair 
to fi rms that do not receive the subsidies. They divert scarce public 
dollars from wiser investments in the workforce or infrastructure. And 
they frequently fail to even generate a positive fi scal impact. But sadly, 
state and local policymakers keep on providing them, thereby weaken-
ing the tax base and escalating the costs of the incentives customarily 
offered. Ultimately, the only way to turn this situation around is via 
Congressional action and complementary litigation on Interstate Com-
merce grounds.
What can be pursued at the subnational level? Several things. We 
should strengthen performance standards, accountability, and disclo-
sure. In addition, reform advocates must advance and provide evidence 
for the thesis that the best climate for private investment and job cre-
ation is not one loaded with incentives, but one with good schools, qual-
ity higher education, a modern infrastructure, predictable and profes-
sional regulation, research and development, a fair but not excessive 
tax system, amenities, and good public services and governance. More 
policy attention to entrepreneurship and the existing business base is 
needed as well.
Yet, there are problems, politically, with this approach. The citizens 
cannot “eat good government”: they want jobs. Moreover, the payoff on 
many of the preferred foundational investments take time. Constituents 
and their elected leaders want “jobs now.” Therefore, what is needed is 
a viable alternative to the ribbon-cutting that accompanies “successful” 
business attraction efforts.
We need an alternative that generates a return in one year or less, 
that is guaranteed to foster development in all parts of a state (not just 
the most affl uent areas), and that is a game that every community can 
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play and win. In short, we need to generate jobs in a fashion that dwarfs 
the output of the standard business capital subsidy.
That is essentially what I propose in this chapter. And I have two 
questions for all readers: 1) Could this be a “shut them up” alterna-
tive to the fi nal points that business recruiters and chambers typically 
make—that although what we say is right, our alternatives to incentives 
(school reform, entrepreneurship, etc.) take too long to generate results, 
and although incentives may not be a good thing, they are a necessary 
option? And 2) Should we have our own subsidy preferences, which 
could build a new political constituency base for reform, beyond the 
usual suspects, based on rural areas, small and existing business, and 
economically struggling cities? Distilled into its essence: Could more 
fi ne-tuned job creation subsidies be a promising new direction for the 
business incentive reform fi eld? It’s a sort of “if you can’t beat them 
then join them” notion.
I will start by describing the situation in my home state of North 
Carolina. Next, I describe my alternative business subsidy alternatives. 
The chapter closes with a few summary points and questions.1
THE NORTH CAROLINA CASE
The North Carolina economy is struggling. Compared to its state 
peers, it ranks as follows: unemployment rate (45th), short-term em-
ployment growth (44th), involuntary part-time employment (37th) and 
rural/urban disparity (47th). Nineteen North Carolina counties have 
jobless rates with more than 10 percent unemployment. Black unem-
ployment was 10.7 percent in 2002; Hispanic was 10.8 percent. In the 
last few years, 121,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost. Obviously, 
the recent recession and a weak recovery have hit the state hard, and 
more jobs are desperately needed. And like most states, North Carolina 
has a weakened fi scal base. Further cuts in public services are strong 
possibilities.
When an economy is stalled like North Carolina’s, state and lo-
cal offi cials often try to jump-start economic renewal by using tax and 
other business incentives to attract footloose facilities. Their hope is 
that these will sweeten the deal and help their state or community stand 
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apart from the other competitors who are also trying to entice private in-
vestment. Economic development professionals also believe that these 
subsidies will send fi rms the message that this jurisdiction is a good 
place to do business.
THE WILLIAM S. LEE ACT
Prior to the mid-1990s, North Carolina had not been known as an 
incentive-providing state. Its fi rst entry in this all-too-crowded fi eld was 
a grant program, with a number of strong job quality and environmental 
standards. But, as the competition for trophy facilities heated up and 
the state lost out on some high-profi le projects, its policymakers felt 
compelled to enter the sweepstakes. Created in 1996, the William S. 
Lee Quality Jobs and Business Expansion Act has been the principal in-
centive tool used by the state of North Carolina for business recruitment 
and expansion. Businesses may qualify for the Lee Act tax credits by
• creating new jobs,
• investing in machinery and equipment,
• incurring the expenses of training workers,
• undertaking research and development efforts, and/or
• establishing a headquarters or central administrative offi ces.
The act has been amended repeatedly since its inception in order 
to update and refi ne its tier targeting approach and to make the credits 
available for specifi c projects. It has three main goals:
 1) help existing fi rms stay competitive by encouraging modern-
ization and investment in new technologies,
 2) encourage new investment in North Carolina’s economy from 
both new and existing industries, and
 3) ensure that economic growth reaches all people in all parts of 
the state, particularly distressed rural counties and high-pov-
erty urban areas.
Counties are divided into fi ve economic distress tiers based on 
unemployment rate, per capita income, and population growth of the 
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county. For many of the credits, the lower the tier of the county, the 
more favorable the incentive.
In summary, an offi cial summary and assessment document on the 
law states the following:
Before 1996, North Carolina made little use of tax incentives to 
lure businesses to the state. Even without incentives, North Caro-
lina was consistently one of the top states in attracting industry. 
The array of credits authorized by the Lee Act was viewed as an 
experiment, to be evaluated in fi ve years to determine whether 
the incentives were cost effective and actually affected behavior, 
or merely provided tax reductions to businesses that would have 
located or expanded in any case. In 1999, the General Assembly 
extended the 2002 sunset to 2006. (Luger 2003)
CONTROVERSY OVER INCENTIVES
The Lee Act was created by the North Carolina legislature as an 
experiment to see whether tax incentives could successfully create jobs 
and increase private investment, especially in economically distressed 
parts of the state. Recently, the North Carolina Department of Com-
merce’s own commissioned research has concluded that only about 4 
percent of the jobs claimed under the act were induced by the Lee tax 
credits and that most of the incentives and private investment are going 
to the least distressed areas of the state (Luger 2003, p. 1). The Corpora-
tion for Enterprise Development’s (CFED) research further emphasized 
that the state had already cost North Carolina taxpayers $208 million 
with an ultimate liability of over $1 billion.2
Despite these damning fi ndings and a fair amount of press cover-
age, the governor called a special session for the North Carolina Gener-
al Assembly to approve specialized grant-based incentive packages for 
a handful of hot prospects.3 The legislature complied with his wishes.
It is also important to note here that the focus of incentive policy 
has shifted from the Lee Act to another grant-based tool: the Job Devel-
opment Investment Grant (JDIG). The Department of Commerce can 
award up to 15 grants annually to strategically important new and ex-
panding businesses and industrial projects. The subsidy is deep—up to 
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70 percent of the personal state withholding taxes are derived from the 
creation of new jobs. JDIG has a performance-based dimension—mon-
ey is only released when jobs are created. An offer by the state, along 
with the grant awarded to the fi rm, only occurs after a fi scal analysis has 
been conducted. Its purpose is to make sure that fi scal benefi ts exceed 
costs. Theoretically, these grants are only given to projects that would 
otherwise not locate in the state. JDIG has a cap on costs per job created 
and a cumulative annual ceiling of $10 million.4
Simultaneously, legislative leadership, worried about North Car-
olina’s current economic misfortunes, including a high-profi le 5,000-
worker textile fi rm closing, created a Joint Select Committee on Eco-
nomic Growth and Development. This committee is charged with ex-
amining the state’s economic conditions and opportunities and develop-
ing new ideas. The governor’s offi ce has responded with a laundry list 
of actions, including—you guessed it—more incentives and a corporate 
tax cut. 
Ironically, in December 2003, North Carolina was named the best 
business climate in the United States by Site Selection magazine (Arend 
2006). This occurred approximately at the same time as the special ses-
sion, which sought to earmark money for trophy projects like Merck, 
Reynolds, and Boeing.
At roughly the same time, bipartisan leadership in the general as-
sembly asked CFED to develop some incentive reform models, which 
they hoped to include in the select committee’s deliberations. As a re-
sult, we pursued three courses: 1) arguing for improved services for 
displaced workers, their families, and their communities (including 
rapid action on mortgage foreclosure mitigation); 2) crafting a variety 
of incrementalist refi nements of the Lee Act and the other two grant-
based incentives; and 3) developing more job creation–focused incen-
tive alternatives.
We argued that the Lee Act was a noble experiment, but in our view, 
the results are clear: the experiment has failed. The William S. Lee Act 
has already cost North Carolina taxpayers $208 million. In these tough 
economic times, the state cannot afford to fi nance these failing tax 
giveaways any longer. It is time to end or seriously restructure the Lee 
Act.5
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FOCUSING ON JOB CREATION: THE TWO MODELS
We have developed two new options for the state. Firms must elect 
to participate in one program or the other, not both.6
 1) A new Job Growth Tax Credit, which would provide a 30 per-
cent tax credit of the fi rst $14,700 of wages paid to each ad-
ditional employee over and above 102 percent of the baseline 
employment. In other words, the state would only subsidize 
additional employment for a fi rm. This incentive would be of-
fered statewide to all sizes of business only in years of high 
unemployment.7
 2) A Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, which would offer 
private employers direct wage and benefi t subsidies in Tier 1 
counties (the most economically disadvantaged) for hiring un-
employed job seekers.8 
It is important to state at the start that the term—job creation, hir-
ing, wage, and employment subsidies—are sometimes used as equiva-
lent expressions. In this chapter, they are not. A hiring subsidy refers to 
funds used to offset wage costs in the initial part of an employee’s pe-
riod of employment with a fi rm. A wage subsidy is one whose purpose 
is to raise an employee’s income. This chapter focuses on job creation 
or employment subsidies. We are exploring ways to increase employ-
ment. This strategy may use wage subsidies, but the purpose is differ-
ent. Both of our options try to create net new employment relative to 
the nation as a whole.
The Job Growth Tax Credit
The fi rst option, the Job Growth Tax Credit, is a refi nement of the 
New Job Tax Credit, one that is tailored to the state of North Carolina. 
During years in which the state’s unemployment rate exceeds 5 percent, 
it would provide subsidies for employment only on the margin (and not 
fi nance all current employment). It would apply to for-profi t fi rms that 
expand employment and be paid to the fi rms.9 In so doing, the tax credit 
lowers the cost of labor for employers, hopefully spurring a substitution 
of labor for capital. The structure of the credit safeguards against a fi rm 
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fi ring all of its current employees and hiring twice as many half-time 
workers who qualify for the tax credit and minimizes the advantages of 
hiring additional part-time workers.
Under this proposal, the credit would be available for fi rms that in-
crease their employment beyond some percentage (say, 2 percent) over 
the base year’s employment level; the base year is that year in which 
the state’s unemployment fi rst exceeds 5 percent. The credit would ex-
ist until the state’s unemployment rate falls below 4.5 percent. Based 
on typical business cycles, we expect the credit to exist for multiyear 
stretches (probably three or four years at a stretch). Assuming that the 
baseline year is announced after January 1, the period in which the cred-
it may be applied should be free of gaming behavior by fi rms; that is, 
fi rms will be unable to adjust their baseline employment to maximize 
their later tax credits. During that period, any fi rm that increases its em-
ployment more than the prescribed percentage will receive the credit. 
The multiyear period would help fi rms make investments that require 
more time, investments that support increased employment (e.g., ex-
pansion of a plant). The credit would be available for each year that the 
fi rm increases its employment above the targeted amount.
The design is antirecessionary and countercyclical. By encourag-
ing expansions in employment during high unemployment periods, the 
state is rewarding fi rms that act, perhaps hastening the recovery. It is 
possible that fi rms may delay expansions until recessionary years (as-
suming that the credit is made permanent and known to kick in during 
times of high unemployment), but there are few fi rms that will postpone 
expansions for years in hopes of gaining a tax credit.
The credit would be applied only to an individual’s wages up to 
some cap (such as 30 percent of the fi rst $14,700 of wages10), which 
would tend to provide an above-average subsidy of jobs for lower-skill 
and lower-wage workers. More specifi cally, under the tax credit, the 
credit to a fi rm will be equal to: 30 percent of the fi rst $14,700 of wages 
paid to each additional employee over and above 102 percent of the 
baseline employment with no cap. Ideally, new fi rms will receive a 
smaller credit: the lesser of 15 percent of the above quantity.11 Ideally, 
this would lower the costs of the credit, because there is a higher chance 
of windfalls with startups that were already planned by their owners.
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The Targeted Job Creation Grant Program
The second approach, the Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, 
would be a refi nement of the Minnesota Emergency Employment De-
velopment Act strategy. On a pilot basis, North Carolina policymakers 
would make a targeted discretionary grant program available to Tier 1 
counties. (If successful, it could be expanded statewide.) 
The state would offer private employers $6.75 per hour in wage 
subsidies and $1.75 per hour in benefi ts (these fi gures represent 2003 
infl ation-adjusted amounts of the original MEED fi gures) for a 26-week 
period to employ certifi ed job applicants suffering severe economic 
distress. Local or regional Workforce Investment Boards would award 
subsidies, on a discretionary basis, to identifi ed employers that hire se-
lected individuals from disadvantaged groups. To be eligible, a worker 
must have been a state resident for at least one month, be unemployed, 
and be currently ineligible for unemployment insurance (or have ex-
hausted his or her six-month UI payments), or be a currently UI-eligible 
individual who has been displaced by a mass layoff (as certifi ed by the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifi cation law) or a member of a 
household with no other source of income than UI benefi ts.12 To reduce 
displacement of current workers, the subsidies would be available only 
for newly created jobs. 
Preference would be given to fi rms that can provide good on-the-
job training in both “soft” and “hard” skills and that are committed to 
“rolling over” these subsidized hires into permanent jobs with some 
prospect for advancement. Indeed, as an incentive for long-term place-
ments, if an employee continues in the job for at least one year after the 
initial six-month subsidy, employers will pay no reimbursement to the 
state. However, for employees that are hired for fewer than 18 months, 
employers will be required to repay up to 70 percent of the subsidy (the 
actual amount will be prorated).
Since these are grants, not tax credits, these subsidies are ideal for 
new, young, and/or small fi rms. (They can be used immediately, not just 
when the fi rms have profi ts or when they fi le their taxes.) Moreover, 
there is little uncertainty about such a program: potentially participat-
ing businesses already exist in North Carolina; they do not have to be 
coaxed to come. They must only have expansion plans that require a 
little fi nancial boost. The upfront grant nature of the subsidy also means 
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that it could improve an enterprise’s fi nancial position for obtaining 
bank loans.
Like MEED, it also probably makes sense to provide these grants 
to nonprofi ts and local public agencies. Except for the requirements 
to create a permanent job and to pay back some of the subsidy, all the 
same rules would apply. 
Furthermore, having this temporary public job alternative is im-
portant for a number of reasons. In many Tier 1 counties, government 
payrolls are one of the major sources of jobs, and recent economic dis-
tress is forcing some local and county governments to terminate some 
positions. Secondly, there are a number of community improvement 
projects that could be implemented and that would not signifi cantly 
compete with the private sector.13
HOW MANY JOBS, AND WHAT WILL THEY COST?
What sort of impact might these two strategies have on the North 
Carolina economy? It is diffi cult to say. We can only make an educated 
projection (and a highly speculative one at that). Here is our reasoning 
and data work. 
We estimate on a net basis that our Job Growth Tax Credit, after sub-
tracting jobs that would have happened anyway, will generate 26,806 
jobs per year.14 The cost is roughly $14,800 per job.15 
For the Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, we project costs and 
benefi ts for a program restricted to Tier 1 counties so as to keep costs 
down and help the most troubled places. If we further deal only with 
net jobs (employment that occurred because of the grant), we estimate 
that it would create about 2,291 net jobs annually in Tier 1. The cost 
is $16,370 per job. If one was citing gross jobs created, the quantity 
of jobs would be doubled and the cost would be roughly halved. Let’s 
compare this net number to the data for the Lee Act as cited in the 
Luger and Stewart report.16 In 2002, 7,702 jobs were created across the 
state. Of these, 465 were in Tier 1 counties (Luger and Stewart 2003). 
Thus, our fi gures are approximately 5 times greater than the Lee Act 
outcomes.
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Now, to look at the full picture: Our two options create jobs at a 
blended cost of $15,527 per job. In the latest in-house assessment of the 
Lee Act, the author comes up with a range of job creation fi gures, from 
87,000 to 147,000 (Luger 2003). A paltry 4 percent of these (i.e., 3,400 
to 5,900) are estimated to have been induced by the Lee Act (Luger and 
Bae 2005). The cost is about $39,475 (Table 7.1).
Our employment numbers are much bigger than those attributed to 
the Lee Act, refl ecting that these proposed programs are targeted to job 
creation and labor intensity and that they would apply to startups, busi-
ness expansions, and new recruitment projects, not just the footloose 
facility waiting to land somewhere.17
Doesn’t this proposal generate proportionately more low-wage 
jobs? Yes, it does. There are times when more jobs (any job) are needed. 
In addition, not all job seekers will have the time, the capacity, or the 
opportunity to get retrained and fi nd a better job. The creation of more 
jobs pushes all wages up. The Job Growth Tax Credit is also meant to 
be a countercyclical tool. It is triggered when it is most needed—dur-
ing a recession and the early recovery period. The availability of fed-
eral Trade Adjustment Assistance wage supplements mitigates the low-
wage problem for jobless workers over 55 years old. If they have lost 
their jobs due to imports or trade-induced relocations and have landed 
new jobs that pay less than the old wage and less than $50,000, they 
may receive 50 percent of the difference between their old and new 
wages for up to two years.
DESIRABLE PROGRAM FEATURES
The fundamental virtue of these two alternatives is that a strong 
rationale could be made for them even if there was no incentive com-
petition. The Job Growth Tax Credit is promoting economic activity 
during a recession and strengthening the early stage of the recovery. 
On the other hand, the Targeted Job Creation Grant is trying to encour-
age more private employment in economically disadvantaged and de-
pressed counties.
Analogous employment programs have been run successfully both 
here and abroad. Research documents that wage subsidies for the job-
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Program Subsidy type Objectives Mechanism Number of jobs Cost per job
Targeted 
Job Creation
Grant • Foster job creation in poor 
tier 1 counties
• Promote the expansion 
of small business
• Grant subsidy for 6 months 
to fi rms hiring unemployed 
job seekers
• Up to $6.75 for 
wages/$1.75 for benefi ts
• Penalty for jobs terminated 
before 18 months





Tax credit • Encourage job creation 
during recessions and 
early recoveries
• 30% tax credit per 
employee of fi rst $14,700 
of salary above 102% of 
baseline employment







Tax credit • Drive private investment 
into poor counties
• Encourage job creation
• Attract premier property
• Foster R&D
• Training credit
• For machinery and 
equipment 4–7% of 
investment above 
threshold





Table 7.1  Incentive Comparisons
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less or less-skilled workers are likely to be more effective when utilized 
in conjunction with labor market intermediaries that help provide some 
training, placement services, and job retention assistance.18 The ben-
efi t/cost ratio can be increased, and the overall expenses can be limited 
by targeting the program to certain communities and potential workers. 
If the recession truly ends, the strategy can be easily converted into a 
welfare-to-work operation and even use welfare monies as a means of 
funding these wage subsidies. 
This strategy is appealing because it does not fi t conveniently into 
any one of the boxes typically used to describe comparable programs.19 
It is an economic development tool. It supports small businesses that 
will be the main users of the program. (Larger fi rms are eligible as 
well.) It is a temporary, countercyclical adjustment program for main-
stream workers. And it balances the above with more of a focus on the 
harder-to-employ, disadvantaged worker.
This program would also help level the playing fi eld for all com-
munities. Many will never land a prime business attraction project, but 
all have indigenous fi rms that might expand with an injection of money. 
All can play and win in this game. Further, it focuses on aiding those 
workers who are suffering right now, unlike the approach of the Lee 
Act, which is structurally indifferent to who gets hired.
The two proposed programs also complement each other. The fi rst 
is administratively less demanding and will be attractive to more es-
tablished fi rms. The second will require more oversight but will be 
very attractive to small fi rms and startups; it targets those needing new 
employment. Moreover, the two have different funding advantages 
and disadvantages. The fi rst option does not require any real out-of-
pocket revenues from the state, while the second will entail a specifi c 
appropriation.
A further comparison with the Lee Act is especially telling. Given 
what’s been happening to the state since it was enacted, a policymaker 
could come up with a new litmus test for new program development. 
For example, 
 1) Does the development reform or new option encourage in-
vestment in those communities that are being hardest hit by 
economic restructuring and dislocation?
 2) Does it improve the reemployment prospects of displaced 
workers?
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 3) Does it help the state’s businesses and sectors compete suc-
cessfully on the basis of innovation, productivity, timeliness, 
fl exibility, and quality in the new global economy?
 4) Do development strategies help to ensure an adequate rev-
enue base for fi nancing essential public services?
The Lee Act only compares favorably with our proposals on the 
third item. But it does so at an unacceptable cost relative to benefi ts.20 
Lastly, our two approaches can be linked with a statewide First 
Source hiring program.21 Such agreements help local/state governments 
target more of the jobs resulting from new business projects to local 
residents, the unemployed and the economically disadvantaged. Such 
agreements require private companies that receive public monies to use 
the public sector or designated nonprofi t contractor as the “fi rst source” 
for new job hires. The state or local government (or a nonprofi t broker 
and job training/placement “shop”) acts as the “job developer” on be-
half of the private fi rm, identifying and screening potential workers, 
arranging training services, and so forth. The private sector is under no 
obligation to hire these workers, but must interview them before seek-
ing any other possible employees. Such programs have been run very 
successfully in Portland, Oregon; Berkeley, California; and Minneapo-
lis, Minnesota. Berkeley’s program, for example, has been used since 
1986 to meet business and construction contractors’ needs for workers, 
while giving special attention to fi lling entry-level and intermediate-
level jobs with qualifi ed local workers (particularly, unemployed and 
underemployed minorities, women, youth, and disabled persons).22
A BUFFALO HUNTER’S REBUTTAL? 
Continuing the argument in the prologue, the proponent of using 
fewer performance-based incentives might argue as follows. 
• You can put so many conditions and complexities on an incen-
tive that it becomes a disincentive.
• The local developer can claim that she needs a more attractive 
incentive to do her job. (Of course, if the state government is 
footing the bill, she has nothing to lose and everything to gain.)
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• Furthermore, the incentive proponent can argue that the Job 
Growth Tax Credit is not really equivalent to a conventional job 
creation or machine and equipment credit, because it is not avail-
able at all times. The grant program is mainly a small business 
subsidy, targeted at the most needy areas. So, it too is not helpful 
for attraction purposes.
Does this leave the author of this paper with no ammo for a counter-
argument? Here is my response:
My critics are right: the alternatives proposed in this chapter are less 
attractive to business. This is inevitable, because the fi nancial interest 
of the shareholders of the business prospect and the state government 
are not completely in sync. The shareholders want to maximize the in-
centive offer, get it in cash rather than in-kind, and have the least strings 
attached. The state (or local, if it’s fi nancing the incentive) government 
has a different bottom-line: it wants jobs and private investment on its 
terms, which includes, most importantly, a fi scal surplus generated by 
their incentive investment. 
But there is a political dimension as well. If the citizenry understands 
and supports cost-effective incentives offered by fi scally responsible 
public offi cials that are targeted at priority economic development and 
employment challenges, then this chapter’s proposals look stronger. 
The Buffalo Hunter still has a fi nal response. He points out that 
his way of working still possesses more political muscle and it is more 
widely understood. “Unilateral disarmament is not an option,” he says. 
“I assure you, citizens, that I will never leave you undefended. I will 
court every opportunity for jobs.”
He also has a constituency base that can be more easily mobilized. 
Local developers, chambers of commerce, and county offi cials, along 
with governors and secretaries of commerce want tools for deal mak-
ing. At this time, they are rewarded for winning or losing this game. 
They are deeply interested and engaged in keeping incentives around 
while other constituencies, such as school teachers, unions, communi-
ties that will never land a plum plant, environmentalists, and advocates 
for the poor and progressive taxation are only marginally engaged in 
this fi ght.
Looking again at the North Carolina case surfaces another dimen-
sion that should be discussed. There is growing interest in reforming the 
Lee Act. Some, even in the mainstream economic development com-
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munity, may be willing to let William S. Lee go. But this is only accept-
able if JDIG gets more resources.
The state’s relatively new JDIG has some good elements.23 The com-
mittee that manages the JDIG funds has authored an excellent series of 
guidelines for making decisions and holding fi rms accountable for pri-
vate investment and job creation. I especially like the required upfront 
fi scal impact analysis, the cap on the costs per job, the limit on number 
of projects per year, disclosure and reporting requirements, quality job 
and company standards, employment-triggered releases of funds, the 
contractual breach language, and the sanctions for noncompliance.24 
The virtue of this program is its vice: it is very fl exible, which means 
that it allows for highly tailored incentive packages. This customization, 
along with the size of the subsidy, makes it extremely attractive to pros-
pects. But there’s a downside: it also raises the specter of the “winner’s 
curse”—in the heat of the state-to-state competition and in the absence 
of knowing what the fi rm’s bottom line is or what other communities 
may be offering, you pay too much for the honor of hosting this fi rm.
This is why I argue that the upfront fi scal impact analysis is so im-
portant. These fi scal projections must be conservative and must not use 
infl ated multipliers. They must count all the state and local incentives 
on the table and recognize that a certain number of jobs will go to non-
natives. They must use a reasonable discount rate over time, and they 
must factor in somehow and subtract the percentage of jobs that would 
have happened anyway.
Given the importance of the fi scal impact analysis in avoiding the 
winner’s curse, its credibility and integrity might be increased if the 
analysis were conducted not by the Commerce Department, but instead 
by the Department of Revenue or Fiscal Research in the General As-
sembly. (There are no accusaitons here of wrongdoing; the change, 
however, could remove any potential doubts and concerns.)
The likelihood of a favorable ratio of benefi ts over costs is much 
more likely if the unemployed or the working poor get a shot at these 
jobs. This is why imposing a “First Source” hiring requirement on JDIG 
or any other subsidy is so important.
In my view, any expansion in dollars and numbers of projects annu-
ally must be contingent on these reforms of JDIG.
One further recommendation: I strongly suggest that any new in-
centives proposed to the General Assembly must have a fi scal note at-
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tached to them and must specify the management information system 
and outcome measures that must be in place before the incentive is open 
for business. This would greatly aid the General Assembly and com-
merce staff in monitoring and evaluating the incentive’s results.
So, who won the argument? In some ways, it looks like the buffalo 
hunter once again had the last word, but hopefully not the last laugh.
That’s why it all comes down to innovative accountability reforms for 
the short-term and civic education, advocacy, and politics for the long 
haul.
CONCLUSION
Business incentives for attracting private capital are, at best, a nec-
essary evil. Indeed, in giving away public resources, states are trying 
to infl uence where the jobs will be located, not whether the jobs are 
created. The offer typically is not: “If you can help us fi nancially, then 
we can afford to take a risk to build a new line of profi table business.” 
Rather, it is: “We have a new line of profi table business, so we’re going 
to build a new plant. How much will you give us to build it near you.” 
This whole “auction” is largely a waste of limited public resources.
To conclude, this is the current situation in North Carolina. CFED’s 
two “models” are being translated into legislation by General Assem-
bly staff. CFED was asked to testify before the Joint Select Committee 
on February 19, 2004. Some progress has been made in getting this 
Committee concerned about the recent rise in mortgage foreclosures. 
Plans are in the works to establish an ad hoc coalition for incentive 
reform and improved displaced worker services. The jury is still out 
regarding the substance and political viability of a more job creation–
focused approach to business incentives.
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Notes
 1. Many of these ideas were developed in collaboration with a CFED colleague, 
Lillian “Beadsie” Woo. We also received a great deal of good advice from econo-
mists John Bishop, Tim Bartik, and Robert Haveman.
  2. Between 1996 and 2001, the accumulated value of the tax credits generated was 
$1.16 billion, of which $208 million were claimed. “Generated” credits are ones 
in which a business has successfully applied for a credit. “Claimed” credits are 
ones where a business has actually invoked the credit and is paying fewer taxes. 
Some credits can actually expire over time if they are not claimed.
  3. Sample projects included Boeing and Merck. These might be called ad hoc sub-
sidies rather than “statutory-based” subsidies.  
  4. To date, North Carolina has funded six projects. Most were located in Tier 5 
counties, the most affl uent. They include General Dynamics Armament and 
Technical Products (headquarters and light manufacturing); Infi neon Technolo-
gies North American Corporation (semiconductor company from Germany, with 
U.S. headquarters in California and operations across the United States); R.H. 
Donnelley Corporation (publishing company, headquarters relocating from Ver-
mont); GE Nuclear Energy (headquarters moving to North Carolina); and Good-
rich Corporation (expansion of existing facility, moving from Illinois and New 
Jersey).
 5. For a much more detailed critique, see Schweke and Woo (2003a). We have also 
crafted a more incrementalist reform of the Lee Act.
  6. For a thorough description and defense of these models, see Schweke and Woo 
(2003b).
  7.  This option was an adaptation of the federal New Jobs Tax Credit (1977–1978). 
The background literature on it is cited in Schweke and Woo (2003b).
  8. The grant program is based on the successful Minnesota Emergency Employ-
ment Development Act in the 1980s.
  9. In the interests of fairness and the potential to create a larger employment impact, 
when enacted, the tax credit should be limited to fi rms in those sectors that pro-
duce goods and services that are either exported to other states or countries or are 
substitutes for goods and services that would otherwise have to be imported. The 
Lee Act has some eligibility wording that could be used or adapted. Moreover, 
CFED has a list of those industries that should be eligible for the tax credit and 
will gladly make it available upon request.
  10. The mathematical rationale is as follows: a fi rm that chooses to hire 10 people 
for a total cost of $250,000 in salaries gets a better tax deal than a fi rm that hires 
5 people for $250,000. Firm 1 can take a credit of $44,100, while fi rm 2 only 
gets $22,050. The tax credit’s structure, therefore, subsidizes a higher percentage 
of lower-waged employees’ salaries. $14,700 is the fi gure for North Carolina’s 
FUTA wages. This is for the unemployment insurance tax that fi rms pay. 
 11. There may be legality issues with having two rates, so this may not be possible.
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 12. The Targeted Job Creation Grant could be made administratively simpler by be-
ing available for hiring any unemployed North Carolinian, but we were trying to 
address those people in greatest need.
 13. For more detail about public versus private job creation, see Johnson, Schweke, 
and Hull (1999).
 14. We assume that 30 percent of the job growth is directly attributable to the tax 
credit. The typical time for the national economy to go from peak to trough is 
seven years. We can assume, then, that the tax credit would be operational for 
about half that time, or three years. That brings the total number of jobs created 
to 80,417.
 15. This fi gure may be too high because some of the fi rms that might use the Job 
Growth Tax Credit will use the grant program. So, we may be counting the type 
of fi rm with potential to add some jobs twice. However, we qualify this possible 
overcounting worry by noting that the two options target different sized fi rms to 
some extent. The grant program is more attractive to small, new and young fi rms. 
The tax credit is more of a winner for large and established enterprises.
 16. It should be noted here that the Institute for Economic Development at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina has authored two reports evaluating the Lee Act, one 
in 2001 and another in 2003, plus an interesting report on the North Carolina 
economic development system (see next footnote). In each report, different es-
timates are given for the Lee Act. Sometimes they are only statewide numbers. 
Other times they look at Lee tax credits, in particular, Tiers. Sometimes they are 
citing net jobs, other times they are gross jobs. The 2001 and 2003 Lee assess-
ments used different numbers to derive net jobs. In 2001, the authors claimed 
that 50 percent of the jobs were due to the Lee Act. In 2003, the number was 4 
percent. So, it is often diffi cult to get comparable benchmarks.
 17. We think both options are wise and complementary, but if you can only do one, 
the Targeted Job Creation Grant is the most compelling, because it focuses on 
citizens most in need. 
 18. See Katz and Molina publications in Schweke and Woo (2003b). Also go to “Job 
Initiative” program of Anne E. Casey Foundation at http://www.aecf.org. There 
is an extensive list of relevant publications to consult for more research on the 
role of labor market intermediaries.
 19. In short, the programs are synergistic. Their creators (Haveman, Bishop, Bartik, 
and others) sought to “think outside the box” when they were developed.
 20. Some might argue that the 4 percent fi gure is too low. It might be, but Luger’s 
(2003) calculation is the best number we have at this point. And it does under-
score the danger and reality of inevitable windfalls in any subsidy program.
 21. The administrative monies for implementing the direct grant program can also 
cover much of the expenses of upgrading county and regional job placement 
services.
 22. Excellent discussions of First Source Agreements can be found in Molina (1998) 
and Lyall and Schweke (1996).
 23. JDIG has been catching some heat because four of its fi rst fi ve deals have gone 
to Tier 5 (affl uent) counties. In addition, there is still the inevitable problem that 
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eventually North Carolina competitor states will replicate JDIG or come up with 
another incentive “gizmo.” The whole process starts again.
 24. JDIG could still be strengthened in the areas of performance contracting and 
sanctions for noncompliance.
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